Right to Speedy Trial

      Speedy trial does not mean that upon arraignment of the accused charged for the commission of an offense, the court would then compel the prosecution to proceed with the trial if the fiscal is not ready to present the evidence for the State and the accused is not entitled to demand immediate trial under such circumstances. Neither will the court order the accused to proceed with the trial whenever he is not ready to present his evidence and the prosecution is not likewise entitled to ask the court to order the accused to present his evidence.

      Speedy trial means one that could proceed with the least possible delay with the court fully satisfied that it had given the parties every opportunity to present their respective evidence, consistent with the time-honored doctrine that justice always requires prompt dispatch of judicial business, free from capricious, vexatious and oppressive delays within the bounds of procedural due process.

      In other words, speedy trial simply means a "trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays."

      It must, however, be understood that no general principle of law fixes the time within which a trial must be held to satisfy the requirement of a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial actually is a relative term; for under proper circumstances, delays in the trial of a case cannot always be avoided and this matter is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the court, depending upon the circumstances of such case.

      Finally, where the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated, as for instance the trial of his case is delayed for more than one year due to postponement requested by the fiscal, and approved by the court, the accused is entitled to have the case dismissed.

      Thus, in People vs. Obsania ( L-2447, 29 June 1986) the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, citing the case of People vs Cloribel, declared that the dismissal such as ordered by the court in the case at bar, is not truly, a "dismissal", but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the insistence of the accused on his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of the trial. This dismissal amounted to an acquittal  because the failure of the State to prosecute presupposed that the government did not have a case against the accused who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.