Limitations to Freedom of Expression

Limitations to Freedom of Expression

   The freedom guaranteed by the constitutional provision is not without restrictions. It is subject to State regulation so that it may not be injurious to public welfare. The guarantees of this freedom have not rendered unconstitutional the laws of the State providing punishments for:

      1.) utterances or publication of libelous materials;
      2.) speaking or publishing blasphemous and obscene matters;
      3.) advocacy or violation of criminal laws;
      4.) use of violence or illegal means for the purpose of effecting changes in the political, social and economic life of society.

   The courts have used standard tests to determine whether a particular utterance or speech are of such nature that by uttering them there is a danger of public uprising. These three tests are:

      1.) The Clear and present danger rule

      In the case of Salcedo vs Hernandez (61 Phil 724), the Supreme Court has the occasion to declare that a limitation upon the freedom of speech would result if the speech be such that the danger which will produce the evil that the state has the right to prevent is not only clear but at the same time present.

      2.) The Dangerous tendency rule

      This rule makes it sufficient that the speech has the tendency to produce the consequential evil which the State likewise has the right to prevent. As applied in sedition cases, whenever the words used tend to create a danger of public uprising then these words could properly be the subject of a penal offense.

      Under this rule, two elements must be present:

          1.)  There must be a reasonable ground to believe that the apprehended danger be imminent - that is, the probability of its happening is somewhat certain; and
           2.) That the evil sought to be prevented is a serious one that is to say, the State stands to suffer serious injury.

   3.) The Balancing Interests rule

   Under this rule, the legislative restriction of the freedom of speech or of the press will be considered valid if on balancing, it appears that the public interest serve thereby outweighs the danger of the abridgement of freedom.

   Well-recognized is the authority of the legislature to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and immediate danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would come to an end simultaneously with the overthrow of the government,when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.